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McCullen v. Coakley
12-1168
Ruling Below: McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert granted, 2013 WL
1218466 (U.S. 2013).
Massachusetts residents who regularly engaged in pro-life counseling outside reproductive health
care facilities brought action against Massachusetts' Attorney General, challenging revised
Massachusetts statute, which made it a crime for speakers other than clinic employees acting
within the scope of their employment to be on a public sidewalk within thirty-five feet of an
entrance, exit, or driveway of a reproductive health care facility. The United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts, upheld the act. Residents appealed. The First Circuit held that
law of the case doctrine precluded revisiting facial challenges; employees loitering in buffer zone
did not reflect a viewpoint preference of the state; and residents had adequate alternative means
of communication.
Question Presented: (1) Whether the First Circuit erred in upholding Massachusetts’s selective
exclusion law under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, on its face and as applied to
petitioners; and (2) whether, if Hill v. Colorado permits enforcement of this law, Hill should be
limited or overruled.

Eleanor McCULLEN et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
Martha COAKLEY et al., Defendants, Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit
Decided on January 9, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
SELYA, Circuit Judge
This case does not come to us as a stranger.
At the turn of the century, the Massachusetts
legislature passed a law that created fixed
and floating buffer zones around abortion
clinics. We rejected serial challenges to the
constitutionality of that law. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari.

One might have thought that the matter
would end there, but it did not. In 2007, the
legislature revisited the statute and amended
it to create a fixed thirty-five-foot buffer
zone around the entrances, exits, and
driveways of abortion clinics. The revised
statute drew renewed fire and, in 2009, we
upheld it against a facial challenge. This
decision left open the plaintiffs' as-applied
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challenge, and they unsuccessfully pursued
that initiative in the district court.
The plaintiffs again appeal. They advance a
salmagundi of arguments, old and new,
some of which are couched in a creative
recalibration of First Amendment principles.
Few
subjects
have
proven
more
controversial in modern times than the issue
of abortion. The nation is sharply divided
about the morality of the practice and its
place in a caring society. But the right of the
state to take reasonable steps to ensure the
safe passage of persons wishing to enter
healthcare facilities cannot seriously be
questioned. The Massachusetts statute at
issue here is a content-neutral, narrowly
tailored time-place-manner regulation that
protects the rights of prospective patients
and clinic employees without offending the
First Amendment rights of others. We
therefore affirm the judgment below.
I. BACKGROUND
We briefly recount the historical background
and travel of the case and then describe the
particular circumstances concerning the
three clinic locations that lie at the epicenter
of the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge.
A. Travel of the Case.
The centerpiece of this saga is Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 266, § 120E 1/2 (2007) (the Act).
The provenance and pertinent provisions of
the Act are set out in some detail in
McCullen I and we assume the reader's
familiarity with that account. We rehearse
here only what is necessary to place into
perspective the issues on appeal.

The Act states in pertinent part that “[n]o
person shall knowingly enter or remain on a
public way or sidewalk adjacent to a
reproductive health care facility” (RHCF)
within a designated and clearly marked
buffer zone. The buffer zone spans
a radius of 35 feet of any portion of an
entrance, exit or driveway of a[n RHCF]
or within the area within a rectangle
created by extending the outside
boundaries of any entrance, exit or
driveway of a[n RHCF] in straight lines
to the point where such lines intersect the
sideline of the street in front of such
entrance, exit or driveway.
Four categories of persons identical to those
enumerated in the 2000 version of the law
are exempted:
(1) persons entering or leaving such facility;
(2) employees or agents of such facility
acting within the scope of their employment;
(3)
law
enforcement,
ambulance,
firefighting, construction, utilities, public *4
works and other municipal agents acting
within the scope of their employment; and
(4) persons using the public sidewalk or
street right-of-way adjacent to such facility
solely for the purpose of reaching a
destination other than such facility.
On January 25, 2008, the Massachusetts
Attorney General sent a letter to a wide
audience, including RHCF personnel and
law enforcement agencies. The text of the
letter is reproduced as an appendix to our
opinion in McCullen I. Its stated purpose is
to summarize the provisions of the Act and
offer “guidance to assist [ ] in applying the
four exemptions.”
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On January 16, 2008, the plaintiffs brought
this action against the Massachusetts
Attorney General in the federal district
court. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they
alleged a plethora of constitutional claims.

channels of communication at the
challenged facilities. Following a bench
trial, the court upheld the Act as applied.

The district court bifurcated the case,
separating the plaintiffs' facial challenge
from their as-applied challenge. In due
season, the court addressed the facial
challenge and upheld the Act.

We rehearse the evidence anent the relevant
clinic locations. As a prelude, we note that
each of the plaintiffs engages in
communicative activities outside one of
these three RHCFs.

On appeal, we affirmed, holding the Act to
be content-neutral, viewpoint-neutral, and a
valid time-place-manner regulation. At the
same time, we rebuffed the plaintiffs'
overbreadth claim, citing Hill v. Colorado,
in which the Supreme Court upheld a
Colorado statute regulating communicative
activities within 100 feet of healthcare
facility entrances. We likewise rejected the
plaintiffs' vagueness claim (which focused
on the Attorney General's letter), explaining
that such an attempt at interpretive guidance
cannot alter the meaning of a law that is
clear on its face. Finally, we ruled that the
Act did not constitute an unlawful prior
restraint on protected speech.

1. Boston. The Boston clinic is situated in a
free-standing
building
at
1055
Commonwealth
Avenue
(a
main
thoroughfare in the Brighton section of
Boston). Its front door faces Commonwealth
Avenue; its rear garage entrance faces
Gardner Street. All clinic patients enter
through the front door and must use the
twenty-five-foot-wide public sidewalk along
Commonwealth Avenue. Buffer zones,
marked with yellow arcs and posted signs,
are appurtenant to each entrance.

When the dust had settled, the district court
took up the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge.
As a threshold matter, it invoked the law of
the case doctrine and resisted the plaintiffs'
attempt to reargue the facial constitutionality
of the Act. Next, it granted the defendants'
motion for judgment on the pleadings with
respect to seven as-applied counts. Turning
to whether the Act, as applied, constituted a
valid time-place-manner regulation, the
court concluded that the only trialworthy
issue concerned the adequacy of alternative

B. The Three Sites.

Three of the plaintiffs (McCullen, Cadin,
and Zarrella) regularly engage in “sidewalk
counseling” at the Boston clinic. McCullen
parks her car on Commonwealth Avenue
and festoons it with pro-life signage;
Zarrella sometimes prays aloud; and Cadin
from time to time holds aloft a large pro-life
sign.
A fourth plaintiff, Smith, has demonstrated
outside the Boston clinic for many years. He
has displayed a crucifix, sung religious
hymns, and prayed aloud. His prayers are
meant to be heard by passersby in hopes of
persuading them to opt against abortion. He
sometimes brings a loudspeaker to amplify
group prayers that occur outside the clinic
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on the second Saturday of every month and
on Good Friday.
The plaintiffs insist that they have achieved
success in their counseling efforts: they
speak with prospective patients, elicit
responses, and hand out literature. In some
instances, they have persuaded women to
decide against terminating pregnancies.
McCullen estimates that, during the period
between November 2007 and May 2011, her
sidewalk
counseling
convinced
approximately eighty women to refrain from
seeking abortions.
Despite their accomplishments, the plaintiffs
argue that the buffer zones prevent close
personal contact with their intended
audience and, thus, impede their ability to
communicate effectively. By way of
illustration, Zarrella asserts that, although
women “always” respond to her offers of
enlightenment and assistance, she has not
been able to convince any of them to opt out
of an abortion since the 2007 buffer zones
were put in place.
2. Worcester. The Worcester clinic is
situated in a stand-alone building at 470
Pleasant Street. Its main entrance is
accessible from Pleasant Street and also
from a private parking lot behind the
building. The public sidewalk on Pleasant
Street is nearly fifty-four feet from the main
door and staggered metal fences shield the
front of the building and the private
pedestrian walkway that runs between these
points. Neither the fencing nor the walkway
is on public property. The entrance to the
parking lot is on Dewey Street and all
vehicular traffic must use that entrance.

There are buffer zones marked with painted
white arcs and posted signs on both Pleasant
Street and Dewey Street. More than eightyfive percent of all patients arrive by car,
park in the clinic's lot, and walk directly to
the main door (without setting foot on any
public way).
Two of the plaintiffs (Bashour and Clark)
engage in sidewalk counseling at the
Worcester clinic. They try to divert women
to Problem Pregnancy, a “pro-life pregnancy
crisis center” located across the street.
Bashour prays quietly outside the clinic,
sometimes alone and sometimes with others.
For her part, Clark often displays a large
pro-life sign.
Here, too, the plaintiffs claim to have
achieved some success in their counseling
efforts. They speak with patients, distribute
literature, and persuade women to refrain
from seeking abortions. Notwithstanding
these successes, the plaintiffs aver that the
physical set-up renders their attempts to
communicate “ineffective” by impeding
their ability to view and approach
individuals entering the front door, to make
eye contact with patients, and to
“demonstrate a caring demeanor.” As they
recall it, virtually no patients who park in
the clinic's private lot respond to their
overtures or “make the effort” to venture
outside the clinic's premises. The buffer
zones preclude them from speaking at “a
normal conversational distance” with, or
placing literature near, the vast majority of
patients entering the clinic.
3. Springfield. The Springfield clinic is
situated in a multi-tenant medical complex
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at the corner of Main Street and Wason
Avenue. The building contains at least eight
separate medical offices. It is bordered on
two sides by private parking lots; a third side
abuts another building; and the fourth side
neighbors an open expanse that contains
railroad trackage. Approximately ninety
percent of individuals patronizing the
complex arrive by car and park in one of the
lots.
There are five driveways leading to and
from the complex, two of which have been
painted with white arcs and posted to
establish buffer zones: one on Main Street
and one on Wason Avenue. The remaining
three driveways have painted white arcs but
no signs. They are not, therefore, buffer
zones authorized by the Act. Consequently,
they have no legal effect.
A plaintiff (Shea) prays aloud and engages
in sidewalk counseling outside the clinic. He
habitually displays a large sign that reads
“They're Killing Babies Here.” He laments
that, from and after the creation of the buffer
zones, he has not seen literature provided to
anyone in a vehicle. He estimates that only
five percent of those who arrive by car leave
the clinic's parking lots either to accept prolife literature or to investigate the possibility
of counseling.
II. THE LAW OF THE CASE
We start our appraisal of the merits with the
plaintiffs' exhortation that we revisit
McCullen I, in which we held that the Act,
on its face, is a constitutionally valid timeplace-manner regulation. The district court

found that the law of the case doctrine
barred relitigation of this issue. We agree.
The law of the case doctrine has two
branches. The first, which embodies the socalled mandate rule, “prevents relitigation in
the trial court of matters that were explicitly
or implicitly decided by an earlier appellate
decision in the same case.” The second
“binds a successor appellate panel in a
second appeal in the same case to honor
fully the original decision.” Both branches
of the doctrine apply here.
To be sure, the law of the case doctrine
admits of certain exceptions. But the
circumstances giving rise to those
exceptions are narrowly circumscribed:
A party may avoid the application of the
law of the case doctrine only by showing
that, in the relevant time frame,
controlling legal authority has changed
dramatically; or by showing that
significant new evidence, not earlier
obtainable in the exercise of due
diligence, has come to light; or by
showing that the earlier decision is
blatantly erroneous and, if uncorrected,
will work a miscarriage of justice.
Although the plaintiffs allude in desultory
fashion to the third exception, they make no
reference to the second exception and their
only colorable claim concerns the first
exception.
The plaintiffs base their claim on recent
decisions of the Supreme Court standing for
the wholly unremarkable proposition that
content-based and speaker-based speech
restrictions are disfavored. In their view,
these
neoteric
decisions
have
so
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reconfigured
the
First
Amendment
landscape as to justify a departure from the
law of the case. This impressionistic
argument, though ingenious, elevates hope
over reason. The propositions for which the
plaintiffs cite those cases are no more than
conventional First Amendment principles
recited by the Supreme Court in the context
of factual scenarios far different than the
scenario at issue here.
The decision on which the plaintiffs rely
most
heavily—Citizens
United—is
emblematic of this point. Citizens United
overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, which had held that corporate
entities, as opposed to other speakers, could
be prohibited from engaging in political
speech. The plaintiffs contend that Citizens
United announced, for the first time, a
blanket ban on all speaker distinctions,
whatever the setting. This categorical ban,
they say, should serve to invalidate the Act
as a speaker-specific restriction.
This is an imprecise reading of Citizens
United. The Citizens United Court held that
government cannot entirely prohibit
corporate political speech. In support, it
invoked the “central principle” laid out in
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, to
the effect “that the First Amendment does
not allow political speech restrictions based
on a speaker's corporate identity.” The Act,
of course, makes no such distinction.
The plaintiffs, however, are undaunted.
They seize upon an isolated statement in
Citizens United: “Prohibited, too, are
restrictions distinguishing among different
speakers, allowing speech by some but not

others.” But they yank this statement from
its context and they neglect to mention that
the Court cites Bellotti—a case that
substantially predates McCullen I—for this
proposition. The Court's reliance on Bellotti
is not a mere fortuity. After all, the Citizens
United Court described its decision as a
return to classic First Amendment
jurisprudence rather than a departure
therefrom. The Court did not retreat from its
well-settled abortion clinic/buffer zone
jurisprudence. Seen in this light, we cannot
read Citizens United as undermining the
First Amendment foundation on which our
rejection of the plaintiffs' facial challenge
rested.
So, too, Snyder, in which the Court held that
the First Amendment precludes tort liability
against persons who had peacefully
protested, on public property, at the funeral
of a Marine. Once again, the Court did no
more than apply long-recognized First
Amendment principles. And while it
reiterated the special status of public streets
as the “archetype of a traditional public
forum,” it proceeded to confirm that even
public fora are subject to reasonable timeplace-manner regulations. It is especially
telling that, in making this point, the Court
referred specifically to the abortion clinic
buffer zone that it had upheld in Madsen.
The plaintiffs' reliance on Sorrell is equally
mislaid. The Sorrell Court invalidated a
Vermont law that restricted the sale,
disclosure, and use of pharmacy records for
marketing purposes. The law, on its face,
was content-based and speaker-based, and
had been enacted with the avowed purpose
of “diminish[ing] the effectiveness of
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marketing by manufacturers of brand-name
drugs.”
The case before us could not be more
different. As we explained in McCullen I,
the Act is both content-neutral and speakerneutral. Moreover, the legislature enacted it
to serve a valid, non-speech-related purpose:
public safety.

The short of it is that the First Amendment
principles underpinning our core holdings in
McCullen I have not been materially altered,
let alone abrogated, by any subsequent
Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the
district court did not err in declining the
plaintiffs' invitation to set the law of the case
doctrine to one side and revisit the plaintiffs'
facial challenge to the Act.

In a Rumpelstiltskin-like effort to turn straw
into gold, the plaintiffs dismiss these
important differences and focus instead on
the Sorrell Court's statement that “the
inevitable effect of a statute on its face may
render it unconstitutional.” But this hoary
legal precept (with which we agree) is not
novel. The “inevitable effect” language
derives from the Court's decision in United
States v. O'Brien, which comfortably
predates both our decision in McCullen I
and the Supreme Court's abortion
clinic/buffer zone jurisprudence.

III. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

More to the point, the Sorrell precept is in
no way inconsistent with our holding in
McCullen I. The “inevitable effect” of the
Act is to limit the communicative activities
of all demonstrators (whether pro-choice or
pro-life) to exactly the same extent.

The plaintiffs' principal challenge to the
entry of judgment on the pleadings relates to
their claim of viewpoint discrimination.
They argue that Planned Parenthood
employees and agents have abused the
buffer zones and that this activity constitutes
viewpoint discrimination under the First
Amendment. The district court rejected this
argument on the pleadings, holding that the
plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to
support the claim.

The plaintiffs have also marshaled other
recent Supreme Court cases in their
ambitious effort to reinvent First
Amendment doctrine. It would serve no
useful purpose to canvass these cases. For
present purposes, it suffices that these
decisions, by no stretch of even the most
fertile imagination, sully either the reasoning
or the doctrinal infrastructure of McCullen I.

The plaintiffs challenge the district court's
entry of judgment on the pleadings on
several fronts. We review de novo an order
granting or denying judgment on the
pleadings. To withstand a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, a “complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”
A. Viewpoint Discrimination.

In their complaint, the plaintiffs aver that
“pro-choice advocates [ ] surround, cluster,
yell, make noise, mumble, and/or talk loudly
to clinic clients for the purpose of disrupting
or drowning out pro-life speech and thwart
Plaintiffs' efforts to distribute literature.”
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They further aver that clinic “employees
and/or agents stand idly on the public
sidewalks and streets inside the [buffer]
zone”—sometimes smoking, speaking with
each other or on mobile phones, or drinking
coffee—“even when clinic clients are not
present.”

policy of enforcing the Ordinance ... only
[against] efforts to persuade women
approaching [RHCFs] ... not to receive
abortions or other reproductive health
services, and not [against] communications
seeking to encourage entry into the clinic for
the purpose of undergoing treatment.”

Because this issue was resolved at the
pleading stage, we assume arguendo that the
raw facts are as the plaintiffs have alleged.
The question remains, however, whether the
depicted conduct can fairly be characterized
as viewpoint discrimination attributable to
the state. The plaintiffs say that it can. The
Attorney General demurs.

This case is at a considerable remove from
Hoye. The Hoye court's finding of uneven
enforcement was inevitable in light of the
city's frank admission that it consciously
“enforces the Ordinance in a contentdiscriminatory manner.” In contrast, the
plaintiffs here have not pleaded any facts
that might suffice to ground a claim of
uneven enforcement.

We begin with the basics. The Act, on its
face, is viewpoint-neutral. Although it
contains a “clinic employee” exemption, that
exemption does not purport to allow either
advocacy by an exempt person or
interference by an exempt person with the
advocacy of others.
The plaintiffs strive mightily to overcome
this obstacle. They call our attention to the
decision in Hoye v. City of Oakland. There,
a municipal ordinance prohibited, within a
100–foot zone around entrances to RHCFs,
any knowing or willful “approach within
eight feet of an individual seeking entry to
the clinic if one's purpose in approaching
that person is to engage in conversation,
protest, counseling, or various other forms
of speech.” The Ninth Circuit concluded that
the ordinance was constitutional on its face
but unconstitutional as applied. It predicated
this conclusion on a determination that the
city did not evenly enforce the ordinance;
rather, the city's actions manifested “a firm

The conduct described, without more, has
nothing to do with the First Amendment.
While loitering in a buffer zone by an
exempt person is not expressive in nature
and arguably does not serve the purposes of
the Act, such conduct, simpliciter, does not
prefer one viewpoint over another.
What is more, the employees and agents
about whom the plaintiffs complain are not
state actors but—unlike the municipal police
officers in Hoye—are agents of a private
entity (Planned Parenthood). The Act allows
these individuals to be in buffer zones under
the clinic employee exemption. But to the
extent that they have tried to use their
exempt status either to advocate a particular
point of view or to drown out the plaintiffs'
message, there is no allegation that such
behavior has been sanctioned by the state.
Another point is worth making. If the
plaintiffs believed themselves to be

461

aggrieved by the employee/agent behavior
that they describe, the commonsense remedy
would have been to complain to police
officers or other state authorities. The
pleadings are barren of any allegation that
such a complaint was ever made.
The bottom line is that, to be cognizable, a
claim of uneven enforcement requires state
action. Whatever actions the clinic
employees and agents may have taken, this
record reveals no basis for a plausible claim
that those actions reflect a viewpoint
preference of the state.
B. Overbreadth.
The plaintiffs assign error to the district
court's entry of judgment on the pleadings
with respect to their overbreadth claim.
Although they concede that we rejected a
substantially similar overbreadth claim in
McCullen I, they suggest that the Act may
be overbroad in particular applications.
Overbreadth doctrine invalidates statutes
“not because [the plaintiffs'] own rights of
free expression are violated, but because of a
judicial prediction or assumption that the
statute's very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech
or
expression.” But overbreadth must be both
“real” and “substantial,” as assessed “in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep.” “Where an overbreadth attack is
successful, the statute is obviously invalid in
all its applications, since every person to
whom it is applied can defend on the basis
of the same overbreadth.” Thus, the
appropriate analysis “requires consideration

of many more applications than those
immediately before the court.”
In the case at hand, the parties spar over
whether there is such a creature as an asapplied overbreadth challenge. We need not
grapple with this conundrum because, even
if some overbreadth challenges may contain
an as-applied component, this one does not.
In explaining the district court's supposed
error, the plaintiffs repeat their complaint,
rejected on their facial challenge, that all
communicative activities (as opposed to,
say, purely violent or aggressive activities)
are banned within buffer zones. In
attempting to convert this previously
rejected challenge into a viable as-applied
challenge, they posit that McCullen I cannot
control because it did not specifically
conclude whether the Act is substantially
overbroad at the Boston, Worcester, and
Springfield locations. Withal, they offer no
accompanying factual allegations, other than
pointing to what they identify as five buffer
zones at the Springfield location. As we
already have explained, only two
enforceable buffer zones exist around the
Springfield clinic. Thus, our Springfielddirected analysis considers only those two
zones.
We need not tarry. Here, as in Hill, “the
comprehensiveness of the statute is a virtue,
not a vice, because it is evidence against
there being a discriminatory governmental
motive.” The plaintiffs have not pleaded
facts sufficient to suggest that our earlier
holding in McCullen I does not control their
present claim. Accordingly, the claim fails
under the plausibility standard. It follows

462

that the district court did not err in granting
judgment on the pleadings on the
overbreadth claim.
C. Other Claims.
The plaintiffs attempt to resurrect a number
of other claims that the district court laid to
rest in its entry of judgment on the
pleadings. There are two principal problems.
First, the plaintiffs have not pleaded an
adequate factual predicate. In the absence of
pleaded facts sufficient to distinguish the
plaintiffs' as-applied challenge on these
grounds from their failed facial challenge,
the latter controls the former.
Second, the plaintiffs do not pursue this
battery of claims with developed
argumentation or in any other meaningful
way. We routinely have held, and today
reaffirm, that theories presented on appeal in
a perfunctory fashion are deemed
abandoned. So it is here.
IV. THE AS–APPLIED CHALLENGE
We turn next to the red meat of this appeal:
the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge to the
operation of the Act at the three specific
RHCFs described above. The district court
spurned this challenge; it concluded that
because there are adequate alternative
channels of communication open to the
plaintiffs at each location, the Act comprises
a valid time-place-manner regulation. We
review this conclusion de novo.
With
respect
to
time-place-manner
regulations, the Supreme Court has
explained:

[E]ven in a public forum the government
may impose reasonable restrictions on
the time, place, or manner of protected
speech, provided the restrictions are
justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information.
The district court found that the issues of
content neutrality and narrow tailoring were
definitively resolved by McCullen I. The
plaintiffs lament that this approach
“improperly
narrowed
the
required
constitutional analysis.”
We reject this lamentation. The facts
proffered by the plaintiffs in support of their
as-applied challenge do not raise new or
different issues but, rather, repeat in relevant
part the same fact patterns envisioned in our
adjudication of their failed facial challenge.
It is black-letter law that a plaintiff cannot
rewardingly prosecute an as-applied
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute
based on the same legal arguments and
factual predicate that underpinned an earlier
(unsuccessful) facial challenge.
The congruence between the plaintiffs' facial
and as-applied challenges cannot be
gainsaid. The plaintiffs now attempt to raise
precisely the same arguments about content
neutrality and the significance of the
governmental interest involved that were
squarely raised (and squarely repulsed) in
the course of their facial challenge. The
same can be said of the narrow tailoring
inquiry. In any event, to the extent that the
as-applied challenge in this case implicates
particularities of the three clinic locations,
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those particularities are swept into—and
appropriately addressed by—the inquiry into
the availability of adequate alternative
means of communication.
This brings us to the pivotal question of
whether the Act, as applied, leaves open
adequate
alternative
means
of
communication. Each of the plaintiffs
engages in communicative activities outside
one of the three designated RHCFs.
According to the plaintiffs, these
communicative activities are intended to
influence individuals seeking or considering
abortions as well as “those who approve or
perform abortions.”
The plaintiffs vouchsafe that they prefer to
communicate their message through upclose, gentle conversations, accompanied by
smiles and eye contact. They insist that the
buffer zones authorized by the Act force
them to engage in shorter, louder, and less
personal exchanges. They fear that, without
the ability to “make eye contact and
demonstrate a caring demeanor,” their
communications are ineffectual. As they see
it, the need to stop at the edge of the buffer
zone is devastating; this restriction compels
them to raise their voices, precludes them
from handing literature to prospective
patients in many instances, detracts from
their message, and somehow makes them
seem “untrustworthy.”
Notwithstanding
the
plaintiffs'
importunings, the court below concluded
that adequate alternative means of
communication exist at all three sites. Our
inquiry focuses on this set of conclusions.

The record makes plain that communicative
activities flourish at all three places. To
begin, the plaintiffs and their placards are
visible to their intended audience. Through
their signs and demonstrations, the plaintiffs
disseminate their message and elicit
audience reactions. Their voices are audible.
They have the option (which they sometimes
have exercised) of using sound amplification
equipment. When they and their cohorts
deem it useful to do so, they congregate in
groups outside a clinic, engage in spoken
prayer, employ symbols (such as crucifixes
and baby caskets), and wear evocative
garments. They sometimes don costumes
(dressing up as, say, the Grim Reaper).
To be sure, the Act curtails the plaintiffs'
ability to carry on gentle discussions with
prospective patients at a conversational
distance, embellished with eye contact and
smiles. But as long as a speaker has an
opportunity to reach her intended audience,
the Constitution does not ensure that she
always will be able to employ her preferred
method of communication. In the last
analysis, “there is no constitutional
requirement that demonstrators be granted ...
particularized access” to their desired
audience. As long as adequate alternative
means of communication exist, the First
Amendment is not infringed.
Our inquiry into the adequacy of alternative
means of communication is, of course, sitespecific. At the Boston clinic, all prospective
patients must traverse a public sidewalk to
gain entry. Given this reality, many channels
of communication remain available to the
plaintiffs. Those alternative channels are
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adequate to offset the restrictions inherent in
the buffer zones.
The analysis is somewhat different with
respect to Worcester and Springfield. At
these sites, it is not the buffer zones that
constitute the main impediment to
communicative activity; instead, it is the
prospective patients' unwillingness to
venture off the clinics' private property.
Most prospective patients arrive by car, park
in private lots, and use non-public walkways
to enter the facility. The fact that these
patients are not readily accessible to the
plaintiffs is more a function of the physical
characteristics of the sites than of the
operation of the Act.
This is a critically important datum. The law
does not require that a patient run a publicsidewalk gauntlet before entering an
abortion clinic. That patients choose to stay
on private property or not to stop their cars
on approach is a matter of patient volition,
not an invidious effect of the Act. First
Amendment rights do not guarantee to the
plaintiffs (or anyone else, for that matter) an
interested, attentive, and receptive audience,
available at close-range.
One
additional
observation
seems
appropriate. In the context of abortionrelated demonstrations, the Supreme Court
has specifically recognized the interest of
clinic patients both “in avoiding unwanted
communication” and “pass[ing] without
obstruction.” Consistent with this interest,
the First Amendment does not compel
prospective patients seeking to enter an
abortion clinic to make any special effort to
expose themselves to the cacophony of

political protests. Nor does it guarantee to
the plaintiffs the same quantum of
communication that would exist in the total
absence of regulation. A diminution in the
amount of speech, in and of itself, does not
translate into unconstitutionality. So long as
adequate
alternative
means
of
communication exist, no more is
constitutionally exigible.
We add a coda. Even if the plaintiffs'
audience is diminished in some respects by
the existence of the buffer zones, that
diminution is not constitutionally fatal. The
fact that a regulation “may reduce to some
degree the potential audience for [the
plaintiffs'] speech is of no consequence,” as
long as adequate alternative means of
communication exist.
In an effort to change the trajectory of the
debate, the plaintiffs tout the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Ladue v. Gilleo.
That decision is inapposite here.
Gilleo involved a municipal ordinance that
broadly banned residential signs. Analyzing
the ordinance as a time-place-manner
regulation, the Court assumed the validity of
the city's content-neutral justification and
acknowledged its valid governmental
interest in limiting “visual clutter.” But the
Court took account of the peculiar
characteristics of home-lawn signs and the
“special respect for individual liberty in the
home” and concluded that the ordinance
failed to leave open adequate alternative
means of communication. Of particular
pertinence for present purposes, the Court
explicitly contrasted the home-lawn sign
context with “the government's need to
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mediate among various competing uses,
including expressive ones, for public
streets.” The case at hand falls solidly within
the latter context and, thus, outside Gilleo's
precedential sweep.
One further point must be made. The
decision in Gilleo predates the Court's
abortion clinic/buffer zone line of cases. The
Court's majority in these cases never even
mentions Gilleo. It would make no sense to
wrest Gilleo from its contextual moorings
and use it as a wedge to subvert the Court's
later decisions addressed to the much
different problem of how the First
Amendment operates when the special
concerns of public-sidewalk protests around
abortion clinics are at stake.
We summarize succinctly. On this record, it
is readily apparent that, notwithstanding the
buffer zones authorized by the Act, adequate
communicative channels remain available to
the plaintiffs, including oral speech of
varying
degrees
of
volume
and
amplification, distribution of literature,
displays of signage and symbols, wearing of
evocative garments and costumes, and
prayer alone and in groups. The Act is,
therefore, a valid time-place-manner
regulation as applied to the Boston,
Worcester, and Springfield RHCFs.
V. LEAVE TO AMEND
In a last-ditch effort to save the day, the
plaintiffs asseverate that the district court
erred in denying them leave to amend their
complaint to include a direct challenge to
the Attorney General's letter. We review for
abuse of discretion a district court's denial of

a motion to amend a complaint. As a general
proposition, a denial of a motion for leave to
amend “will be upheld so long as the record
evinces an arguably adequate basis for the
court's decision,” such as “futility, bad faith,
undue delay, or a dilatory motive on the
movant's part.”
The order challenged in this case falls within
the rubric of undue delay. The district court
took a balanced approach. It allowed the
plaintiffs to make amendments at the
margins of their complaint (for example, the
addition of the three district attorney
defendants), but it refused to allow the
plaintiffs to introduce a new theme at so late
a date.
The plaintiffs' original complaint focused
exclusively on the Act. The Attorney
General issued the guidance letter within
two weeks of the filing of the complaint, yet
the plaintiffs chose to ignore it. Not until
September 17, 2010 did the plaintiffs seek to
enlarge their target to include the Attorney
General's letter. That was more than twoand-one-half years after the docketing of
their original complaint. They have offered
no compelling explanation for the delay.
Given the passage of this inordinate period
of time, we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion in drawing the line and
refusing to allow the plaintiffs to refocus
their attack. The plaintiffs had ample time to
get their ducks in a row, and the district
court was under no obligation to give them
more.
VI. CONCLUSION
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We need go no further. For the reasons
elucidated above, we affirm the judgment of

the district court.
Affirmed.
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“Abortion Clinic Buffer Zone Gets U.S. High Court Review”
Bloomberg
Greg Stohr
June 24, 2013
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted a case
that promises to redefine the speech rights of
abortion opponents, agreeing to rule on a
Massachusetts law that creates a 35-foot
buffer zone around clinic entrances.
The justices today said they will hear an
appeal from abortion foes seeking to
overturn the Massachusetts law as a
violation of the First Amendment. The
challengers say they have a right to hand out
leaflets and start conversations with women
entering abortion clinics.
A Boston-based federal appeals court upheld
the measure, pointing to a 2000 Supreme
Court decision that upheld Colorado
restrictions on abortion clinic protests.
Massachusetts enacted the law in 2007,
strengthening an existing measure that had
required a 6-foot buffer zone at abortion

clinics. The new law makes it a crime to
“knowingly enter or remain” in an area
within 35 feet of a clinic entrance, exit or
driveway. The measure exempts clinic
employees and people entering or leaving
the facility.
The high court’s membership has changed
significantly since the 2000 decision. Most
notably, two members of that 6-3 majority,
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, are no longer on the
court. Their successors, Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, are often
sympathetic to free-speech claims.
The justices will hear arguments and rule in
their 2013-14 term, which starts in October.
The case is McCullen v. Coakley, 12-1168.
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“McCullen v. Coakley: Abortion Is Heading to the Supreme Court Again”
PolicyMic
Alexandra Ma
June 18, 2013
On Monday, the Supreme Court agreed to
hear out a challenge from anti-abortion
activists. This time, it is not about the
mothers or their wombs, but about the
freedom of speech.
The challenge from seven anti-abortion
petitioners is directed at the Massachusetts
abortion clinic buffer law that was enacted
in 2000, which bans demonstrations within
35 feet of entrances and driveways of
abortion clinics. The petitioners claim that
the Massachusetts law discriminately
violates their First and Fourteenth
Amendments; in their petition to the
Supreme Court, they write that "The law
restricts the speech of only those who wish
to use public areas near abortion clinics to
speak about abortion from a different point
of view."
The petitioners are backed by anti-abortion
activists, many of whom offer "sidewalk
counseling" to women on their way to the
clinics. They claim that the law unfairly
keeps them from engaging patients in
conversation at a closer distance. Similarly,
Philip Moran, the petitioners' lawyers, said,
"You can't stand outside 35 feet and
communicate with people ... You have to
have eye contact."
The Massachusetts buffer zone laws were
established after a tragic attack was carried
out in 1994 outside an abortion clinic in
Brookline, Massachusetts, when abortion

opponent John C. Salvi III shot two clinic
workers to death and wounded five others.
Many legal challenges had been rejected
prior to this case, but they were revived in
2007 when Governor Deval Patrick signed a
bill extending the buffer zone from 18 to 35
feet.
In 2008, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the law in its ruling in McCullen v.
Coakley, stating that the law upholds both
free speech and abortion patients' rights. The
First Circuit acknowledged, "The nation is
sharply divided about the morality of the
practice and its place in a caring society ...
But the right of the state to take reasonable
steps to ensure the safe passage of persons
wishing to enter health care facilities cannot
seriously be questioned."
Speaking since the Supreme Court's grant of
a writ of certiorari on Monday,
Massachusetts Attorney General Martha
Coakley reiterated her belief that the law
"ensure[s] a women's right to safe access to
health care facilities while preserving First
Amendment rights... We look forward to
defending this vitally important legislation
before the Supreme Court."
Equally hopeful are the anti-abortion
activists, who believe that the buffer zone
laws are a "clear case of viewpoint
discrimination." Executive director of the
Life Legal Defense Foundation Dana Cody
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also expressed her optimism that the
Supreme Court will not only overturn the
law, "but also revisit some of its own prior
precedents that led lower courts to believe
that, as a matter of law, pro-life speech is
less deserving of protection." Moran also
mentioned that he and his clients were
"delighted" that SCOTUS agreed to hear
their case. "We think we have a good shot,"
he said on Monday.
In the past, SCOTUS has rejected a number
of cases, most notably from Indiana and
Colorado, which would have effectively
reopened the debate on abortion, so their
reason for reopening McCullen would be
interesting to explore. Given the optimism
from both sides of the case, SCOTUS's
decision is not going to be easily
predictable.

On one hand, given SCOTUS's sympathetic
stance towards abortion-seekers, this hearing
may serve as a once-and-for-all ruling that
upholds McCullen, thereby setting a
precedent for lower courts to allow buffer
zones protecting women who seek abortion.
On the other hand, SCOTUS may strengthen
the scope of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments,
allowing
anti-abortion
activists to exercise their freedom of speech
anytime, anywhere.
So, watch this space. Given the fine line
between protecting abortion seekers' rights
and the fundamental freedoms provided by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, this
is definitely another SCOTUS judgment for
which we should keep our eyes peeled.
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“Court Upholds Mass. Abortion Clinic Buffer Law”
Boston Globe
Martin Finucane
January 9, 2013
A federal appeals court has again upheld the
buffer zone law for Massachusetts abortion
clinics, saying that the regulation protects
the rights of patients while, at the same time,
allowing others to express their opinions.

“The same rules have to apply to all
speakers. The government cannot put
peaceful pro-life speakers in jail, but give
Planned Parenthood free rein on the same
sidewalk,” he said in a statement.

“Few subjects have proven more
controversial in modern times than the issue
of abortion,” the US Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit said in its ruling on
Wednesday. “The nation is sharply divided
about the morality of the practice and its
place in a caring society. But the right of the
state to take reasonable steps to ensure the
safe passage of persons wishing to enter
health care facilities cannot seriously be
questioned.

The law creates a 35-foot fixed buffer zone
around the driveways and entrances of
clinics. The lawsuit, Eleanor McCullen et al
v. Martha Coakley et al, was brought by
seven people who regularly engaged in
antiabortion counseling outside the three
clinics.

“The Massachusetts statute at issue here is a
content-neutral, narrowly tailored timeplace-manner regulation that protects the
rights of prospective patients and clinic
employees without offending the First
Amendment rights of others,” said the
opinion, written by Judge Bruce M. Selya,
who heard the case, along with two other
judges.
The appeals court ruling affirmed a decision
by US District Judge Joseph L. Tauro last
February.
Mark L. Rienzi, a lawyer representing the
plaintiffs, said they expected to appeal the
decision to the US Supreme Court.

“We are pleased that the court has once
again upheld the Commonwealth’s buffer
zone law which provides safe access to
reproductive health care facilities while
preserving freedom of expression,” Attorney
General Martha Coakley, whose office
defended the law, said in a statement. “We
have always believed, and the court agreed,
that the buffer zone leaves open the
opportunity for civil engagement on public
areas around these facilities while ensuring
that patients and health care providers can
safely access these facilities.”
The challenge to the law was the latest in a
series. “This case does not come to us as a
stranger,” the appeals court said, leading off
its decision.
The court twice upheld an earlier version of
the law, in 2001 and 2004. After the
Legislature revised the law in 2007, the
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appeals court upheld it again in 2009. More
challenges were launched in Tauro’s court.
Tauro rejected them, but the plaintiffs

appealed, leading to the court’s decision
today.
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“Abortion Opponents: 'Buffer Zones' At Abortion Clinics Violate Free
Speech”
US News
Elizabeth Flock
June 25, 2013
The Supreme Court has said it will
reconsider the constitutionality of protest
zones
The Supreme Court announced Monday it
would hear an appeal from abortion
opponents on the constitutionality of a 2007
Massachusetts law that requires protesters to
stand at least 35 feet from abortion
clinics, according to the Associated Press.
Chief among those opponents is the
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, an antiabortion group that's been challenging the
law for years as a violation of their free
speech rights.

Massachusetts Citizens for Life also works
online to persuade women away from
abortions; its website's homepage reads:
"Pregnant? Need Help?" and leads to a list
of Christian missions in Massachusetts that
provide counseling on how to avoid an
abortion.
State lawmakers first approved the law for
protest zones in 2000, motivated in part by
fears of violence at abortion clinics. Just
several years prior, an abortion opponent,
John Salvi, had walked into two Boston-area
Planned Parenthood reproductive health
clinics and opened fire, killing two
receptionists and wounding five more.

"We consider it a First Amendment issue,
because it's a law that targets very certain
facilities, just abortion facilities," says Anne
Fox, the group's president. Protests outside
corporate buildings or by animal rights
activists, for example, do not have protests
"buffer zones." Fox says the zones also
make it nearly impossible for anti-abortion
activists to speak freely to women walking
into clinics to get an abortion.

"People seeking health services should be
able to do so without fear of violence,
harassment or intimidation," Planned
Parenthood League of Massachusetts
President Martha Walz said in a released
statement Monday.

"At many [clinics] people would like to
counsel a woman who would like to know
her options... and this law makes it
extremely difficult. You don't want to yell at
someone, but you really can't get near
them," she says.

"If you're going to have violence, a 35-foot
buffer zone wouldn't help. The only people
abiding this are the peaceful protesters," she
says. "And there are probably four incidents
of violence at abortion clinics a year. It's
much less likely to have violence at a clinic
than at a McDonalds."

But Fox says she doesn't believe buffer
zones can effectively prevent violence at
clinics.
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According to the National Abortion
Federation (NAF), which tracks antiabortion attacks, abortion clinics have seen
less than four attacks per year for the last
several years.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, which is
optimistic the Supreme Court will strike
down the buffer zone law, has had success at
the highest court before.

In 1978, the Federal Election Commission
questioned whether corporate donations had
helped the group print 100,000 pamphlets
calling out the pro-abortion voting records
of candidates. The case went to the Supreme
Court,
which ruled
in
favor
of
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, saying a
ban on corporate electoral spending was
unconstitutional.
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Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice
12-1094
Ruling Below: Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice v. Cline, 292 P.3d 27 (Okla. 2012),
cert granted, 2013 WL 867379 (U.S. 2013).
Coalition of reproductive rights organizations brought action challenging constitutionality of
state statute prohibiting prescription of abortifacient medication. The District Court held statute
unconstitutional and enjoined enforcement thereof. State appealed.
Question Presented: Whether H.B. No. 1970, Section 1, Chapter 216, O.S.L. 2011 prohibits: (1)
the use of misoprostol to induce abortions, including the use of misoprostol in conjunction with
mifepristone according to a protocol approved by the Food and Drug Administration; and (2) the
use of methotrexate to treat eptopic pregnancies. Further proceedings in this case are reserved
pending receipt of a response from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

OKLAHOMA COALITION FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE, on behalf of itself and its
members and Nova Health Systems, d/b/a Reproductive Services, on behalf of itself, its
staff, and its patients, Plaintiffs/Appellees,
v.
Terry CLINE, in his official capacity as Oklahoma Commissioner of Health, Lyle Kelsey,
in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Oklahoma State Board of Medical
Licensure and Supervision, Catherine V. Taylor, in her official capacity as the President of
the Oklahoma State Board of Osteopathic Examiners, Defendants/Appellants.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma
Decided on December 4, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
Per curiam
This is an appeal of the trial court's
summary judgment which held House Bill
1970, unconstitutional. Upon review of the
record and the briefs of the parties, this
Court determines this matter is controlled by
the United States Supreme Court decision in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which was
applied in this Court's recent decision of In
re Initiative No. 395.

Because the United States Supreme Court
has previously determined the dispositive
issue presented in this matter, this Court is
not free to impose its own view of the law.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
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made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
The Oklahoma Constitution reaffirms the
effect of the Supremacy Clause on
Oklahoma law by providing: “The State of
Oklahoma is an inseparable part of the
Federal Union, and the Constitution of the
United States is the supreme law of the
land.” Thus, this Court is duty bound by the
United
States
and
the
Oklahoma

Constitutions to “follow the mandate of the
United States Supreme Court on matters of
federal constitutional law”
The challenged measure is facially
unconstitutional pursuant to Casey. The
mandate of Casey remains binding on this
Court until and unless the United States
Supreme Court holds to the contrary. The
judgment of the trial court holding the
enactment unconstitutional is affirmed and
the measure is stricken in its entirety.
ALL JUSTICES CONCUR.
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“Supreme Court tells Oklahoma to Review Abortion Pill Law”
Los Angeles Times
David G. Savage
June 27, 2013
The Supreme Court told the high court of
Oklahoma on Thursday to clarify a new
state law restricting the use of the RU-486
abortion pill, setting the stage for a possible
future ruling on how far states can go in
regulating the practice of abortion.
Legislators in several states, including
Oklahoma, have passed laws to strictly
regulate the practice of abortion. Among
them are measures that require all women
seeking abortions to undergo an ultrasound
test. Oklahoma also adopted a law
restricting the use of RU-486.
But the Oklahoma Supreme Court blocked
these laws from taking effect, saying they
conflicted with a 1992 Supreme Court
decision on abortion.
The justices, in their last meeting until late
September, granted in part an appeal from
Oklahoma Atty. Gen. Scott Pruitt on
Thursday, but then sent the case back to
Oklahoma for the state court to further
explain how the RU-486 law would work in
practice.
The court’s action will put off consideration
of the issue until the state court acts.
At issue ultimately is the meaning of the
high court’s 1992 decision in Planned

Parenthood vs. Casey, which upheld a
woman’s right to choose abortion, but said
states may regulate the practice, so long as
they do not put an “undue burden” on the
patients or their doctors.
The justices did not closely define what
regulations were permitted, and they have
largely stood aside since then. Their only
major abortion ruling in recent years upheld
the federal law that prohibited late-term
abortions.
Besides Oklahoma, Louisiana, Texas and
North Carolina have adopted laws requiring
women to undergo ultrasound tests for
nearly all abortions, even if they and their
doctor object.
The two sides in the Oklahoma case differ
sharply on the law regulating mifepristone,
or RU-486. The state says it wants doctors
and patients to follow the federal guidelines
in using the drug. State lawmakers said they
were seeking to protect the health of women.
Lawyers for the Center for Reproductive
Rights said the regulations, if put into effect,
would prevent women from using the
abortion pill. “The statute at issue here
effectively bans all abortions using
medication, rather than by surgery,” they
told the high court.
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“Abortion-Drug Case on Docket for Now”
Wall Street Journal
Louise Radnofsky & Brent Kendall
June 27, 2013
The U.S. Supreme Court on Thursday
expressed interest in examining an
Oklahoma law restricting the use of
abortion-inducing drugs, raising the prospect
of a ruling on an increasingly prevalent form
of abortion.
The high court hasn't previously considered
what kind of rules on drug-induced
abortions might pass constitutional scrutiny.
In the 1973 Roe v. Wade ruling and
subsequent decisions modifying it, the
Supreme Court has said women have a right
to an abortion, while upholding certain state
restrictions,
such
as
waiting-period
requirements.
The justices announced in a short written
order that they would review the Oklahoma
case, but added an asterisk: Before the court
would move forward, it wished to hear the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's views on how
the state's law works. That left open the
possibility that the high court could delay
action or drop the case altogether after the
Oklahoma court responds.
The appeal before the Supreme Court
centers largely on RU-486, which was
approved by the Food and Drug
Administration in 2000 for use in
terminating pregnancies.
Abortion-rights supporters say the drug and
others like it expand women's access to
abortion, because they are cheaper and less

invasive than surgical abortions, can be
taken privately and can be made available in
areas where there are few or no abortion
providers.
An Oklahoma law requires doctors to use
FDA protocol when they administer RU-486
and other abortion-inducing drugs. The law's
challengers—an abortion-rights group and a
medical clinic—said in court documents that
the state law effectively bans all abortions
performed using the medication because
doctors have developed better methods for
administering the drugs that don't follow the
original FDA protocol.
After Oklahoma enacted the law in 2011,
state
courts
struck
it
down
as
unconstitutional, prompting Oklahoma
Attorney General E. Scott Pruitt to appeal to
the U.S. Supreme Court in a bid to save the
measure.
Mr. Pruitt said the state was trying to protect
women from off-label use of abortioninducing drugs, which Oklahoma officials
say has led to eight deaths. Oklahoma says it
isn't trying to ban drug-induced abortions
outright.
"We look forward to the opportunity to
defend Oklahoma's right to protect its
citizens," Mr. Pruitt said.
Antiabortion activists praised the high
court's indication it would consider the
issue. "The Supreme Court has taken a first
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step toward protecting women and girls
from the abortion industry's callous
disregard for their health and safety when
using life-ending drugs," said Charmaine
Yoest, president of Americans United for
Life.

Some 39 states require abortion-inducing
drugs to be prescribed by a licensed
physician. Four states—Arizona, North
Dakota, Ohio and Oklahoma—have passed
laws restricting physicians to follow the
FDA protocol.

Abortion-rights supporters say state
restrictions on the drugs may tie doctors'
hands and pose an undue burden on access
to abortion. "This method has clearly been
under attack," said Morgan Meneses-Sheets,
program manager of the Reproductive
Health
Technologies
Project.
"Our
opponents have been very creative and
successful at carving away access."

Twelve states have required the prescribing
physician to be present when the drug is
taken, barring the use of telephones or video
conferencing, although not all of those laws
are currently in effect.
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“The Next Abortion Case is Here”
The New York Times
Linda Greenhouse
September 4, 2013
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, author of the
5-to-4 opinion in June that struck down the
Defense of Marriage Act, may well be a
hero to the gay rights community, and
deservedly so. But he’s also the author of
the 5-to-4 opinion that upheld the federal
ban on so-called partial birth abortion back
in 2007, and abortion-rights advocates have
viewed with something close to dread the
prospect that he could play a similarly
decisive role in the Supreme Court’s next
abortion case.
That case has arrived.
It’s understandable if you haven’t heard of
Cline
v.
Oklahoma
Coalition for
Reproductive Justice, which has received
relatively little attention since the court
accepted it on June 27, the day after the term
ended. The lack of attention is itself
understandable.
The case is an appeal by the state of
Oklahoma from a ruling by its Supreme
Court striking down a law that limits
doctors’ ability to prescribe the pills used to
terminate early pregnancies. The medical
abortion regimen, often referred to as RU486, was approved by the Food and Drug
Administration in 2000 as a safe and
effective alternative to surgical abortion
early in the first trimester. It has been used
since then by close to two million American
women, currently about 200,000 a year out
of some 1.2 million abortions performed

annually. The Oklahoma law doesn’t ban the
medical procedure. Rather, it requires
doctors to follow the dosage and other
instructions on the F.D.A. label. Viewed
outside its context in the battle over
abortion, the law looks perfectly sensible, a
routine state regulation of medical practice.
(Spoiler alert: it isn’t.)
Further muddying the waters, the case is
procedurally messy. While accepting it, the
justices deferred scheduling it for argument
until they receive clarification from the state
court about what medications the somewhat
ambiguously worded statute applies to. A
request to another court for clarification,
known as a certified question, is not
unheard-of at the Supreme Court, but it is
unusual. It gives the court’s order granting
review a tentative look, as if the justices are
less than fully committed to deciding the
case. It’s possible that after receiving the
state court’s answer (there is no deadline,
but the state court has invited briefs from
interested groups and is likely to hear
argument in October), the justices will
decide not to proceed.
Possible but not, I think, likely. This case
simply presents too tempting a target, for the
very reasons that lie behind the emergence
of this seemingly technical dispute about
medical practice. At issue is the Supreme
Court’s own unstable abortion doctrine,
specifically on where five justices might be
willing to draw a line between acceptable
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and impermissible obstacles to access to
abortion.
While not everything about the case is clear
yet, one aspect is perfectly obvious: the
court’s grant of review was no casual matter.
Some justice or group of justices (it takes
four votes to accept a case) spotted this case
as a potential vehicle for saying something
bigger about abortion and its regulation. By
the same token, it’s no accident that medical
abortion (or medication abortion, as it is also
known) is the latest flash point in the
abortion
debate.
That
may
be
counterintuitive, given the prolonged handwringing over “partial-birth” and other
“late-term” abortions; medical abortion is
most effective in the first six or seven weeks
of pregnancy (by which time the embryo is
about the size of a pencil eraser) and doesn’t
work after nine weeks (still in the first
trimester, which is when about 90 percent of
all abortions take place).
But if you think about it, it’s evident why
opponents of abortion have begun to focus
on the early nonsurgical procedure. Medical
abortion is the ultimate in women’s
reproductive empowerment and personal
privacy. All it takes are two pills:
mifepristone, sold as Mifeprex, which
blocks the hormone progesterone, without
which a pregnancy can’t continue, and
misoprostol, taken two days later, which
causes the uterus to contract and expel the
early pregnancy. In many states, women can
take the second pill at home.
As abortion clinics are forced to close
because of onerous state regulations (54
clinics in 27 states have closed in the last

three years, and many women live hundreds
of miles from the nearest provider) and as
women entering clinics often have to run a
gauntlet of protesters seeking to “counsel”
them (in its new term, the Supreme Court
will hear a First Amendment challenge to a
Massachusetts “bubble zone” law that keeps
speakers 35 feet away from the entrance to a
“reproductive health care facility”), medical
abortion offers an end-run around the
obstacles that for years have been a core part
of opposition strategy.
That’s why, for example, 17 states have
recently passed laws or issued regulations
barring doctors from using video
conferencing — “telemedicine” — to
prescribe the abortion pills. Although video
conferencing is increasingly popular in other
medical settings, abortion is the only context
in which states have sought to ban it. For a
medical abortion, a nurse examines the
woman by ultrasound as the doctor views
the results over a video link. Having
determined the stage of the pregnancy, the
doctor then advises the woman on what to
expect from the medication and dispenses
the pills by sending a command that opens a
drawer in the office. After taking the
sequence of pills, the woman returns two
weeks later for a follow-up visit.
Some 8,000 women in Iowa have used this
procedure, which was pioneered in the state
by Planned Parenthood and authorized in
2011 by the Iowa Board of Medicine. The
board reversed itself last week. It acted on a
petition from anti-abortion groups and with
the support of Gov. Terry Branstad, an
abortion opponent whose appointees to the
board include a Catholic priest, Msgr. Frank
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Bognanno. Governor Branstad’s declaration
that the video ban will “protect the health
and well-being of Iowa women” had a
familiar ring. Protecting women is always
the stated rationale for new restrictions on
abortion, even when the rationale is — as in
Iowa, and as in the Oklahoma case before
the Supreme Court — hogwash.
The law at issue in the Supreme Court case
wasn’t drafted in Oklahoma. It was written
in Chicago by an influential anti-abortion
organization, Americans United for Life,
and included as the “Abortion-Inducing
Drugs Safety Act” among 30 model laws
made available for sponsorship by state
legislators. In the name of patient safety, the
statute makes it a crime for doctors to
deviate from the dosage and other
instructions published by the Food and Drug
Administration when it approved the
medication in 2000.
The problem is that after 13 years, with
millions of medical abortions having been
provided in Europe and Asia as well as the
United States, medical opinion about the
appropriate dosage and other aspects of
administering the drugs has evolved, as it
often does after a new medication enters
widespread use. Instead of 600 milligrams
of Mifeprex, doctors now use only 200.
While the original F.D.A. label specified
that the drugs should be used only up to 49
days of pregnancy, doctors have found the
regimen safe and effective for up to 63 days
— nine weeks of pregnancy. Instead of
requiring a second office visit for the second
drug, as specified by the F.D.A., doctors
now often give the patient the second drug
to be taken at home, saving her an

unnecessary trip. The 200-milligram
regimen is so widely accepted that the 600milligram dose is now considered bad
medicine, and many doctors would refuse
the procedure entirely rather than follow the
old guideline.
Post-approval modifications in the way
doctors use drugs are known as off-label
uses. Off-label usage is extremely common,
permitted by federal law. Prescribing antidepressants to treat nerve pain and
menopausal hot flashes is one current
example. What’s unusual about the medical
abortion situation is that doctors are simply
prescribing less of an approved drug for its
approved use, rather than turning a drug to a
different use altogether.
In the Oklahoma case, a state trial judge,
Donald L. Worthington, reviewed the
evidence and found that the lower dose of
Mifeprex was being used “in a great
majority of cases of medication abortions in
the United States” and had been
“demonstrated by scientific research to be
safer and more effective” than the original
F.D.A.-approved dose. Requiring doctors to
use the higher dose, the judge concluded in
an opinion in May of last year, was “so
completely at odds with the standard that
governs the practice of medicine that it can
serve no purpose other than to prevent
women from obtaining abortions and to
punish and discriminate against those
women who do.” The Oklahoma Supreme
Court affirmed the decision last December.
Unlike the trial judge’s eight-page opinion,
however, the state high court’s unanimous
three-paragraph opinion offered no analysis.
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It simply declared that “this matter is
controlled by the United States Supreme
Court decision in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,” a decision that “remains binding on
this court until and unless the United States
Supreme Court holds to the contrary.”
Planned Parenthood v. Casey was the 1992
decision that reaffirmed the basic right to
abortion while also permitting states to
adopt new restrictions. In its opinion, which
Justice Kennedy joined, the court said it
would permit restrictions that did not impose
an “undue burden,” defined in the opinion as
“a state regulation that has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus.” More than two decades
later, all the important words in that
definition of undue burden remain contested.
What kind of obstacle is “substantial”? What
is a prohibited “effect”? To the present
point: does the court really care about
“purpose” — the real purpose behind an
abortion restriction — or is it satisfied by a
state’s counter-factual claim that the purpose
is to protect women?
In a brief he filed three weeks ago to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, E. Scott Pruitt,
the state’s attorney general, said the
legislature’s purpose “was to solve the
problem of physicians using potentially
dangerous unapproved protocols.” Really?
Requiring doctors to prescribe three times
more of a drug than they think is called for
is a safety improvement? When Gov. Mary
Fallin signed the bill in May 2011, she was
more candid, calling it “a critical part of our
effort to promote the cause of life.” Does
candor matter to the Supreme Court?

It didn’t to Justice Kennedy when he wrote
the partial-birth abortion majority opinion in
2007. He accepted as fact a claim for which
there was no valid basis: that the prohibited
procedure placed women at special jeopardy
for acute post-abortion regret, “grief more
anguished and sorrow more profound,” as he
put it. As evidence, he cited a brief filed on
behalf of “180 Women Injured by
Abortion,” a document filled with personal
“affidavits” by women who described
vividly how sorry they were for having had
terminated their pregnancies (notably, few
actually discussed any particular method of
abortion).
Lo and behold, the new case has brought
with it to the Supreme Court a “Brief of
Women and Families Hurt by RU-486,”
filed in support of the state’s appeal by the
same lawyer who organized and filed the
earlier brief. It, too, contains personal
testimonies, although not one actually says
anything on the question before the court of
more Mifeprex or less.
Not knowing Oklahoma judicial politics, I
can only guess at the reason for the state
court’s failure to analyze the case instead of
invoking Planned Parenthood v. Casey is a
purely conclusory fashion. At the least, the
three-paragraph opinion was odd. Were the
Oklahoma justices simply ducking for cover
under the shadow of Casey? Or were they
inviting, even prodding, the Supreme Court
to reconsider Casey? Along with Justice
Kennedy, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was
also a member of the five-justice majority in
1992. With Justice O’Connor replaced by
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., there may no
longer be a majority on the court to strike
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down any burden on access to abortion, even
one that is obviously and purposefully
“undue.” All that binds the current court to
the Casey standard — whatever that

standard can be said to mean today — is
stare decisis, respect for precedent. As the
Roberts court begins Year 9, that may not
count for much.

484

“Oklahoma Abortion Laws Unconstitutional, State Supreme Court Rules”
Huffington Post
Tim Talley
December 4, 2012
Oklahoma laws requiring women seeking
abortions to have an ultrasound image
placed in front of them while they hear a
description of the fetus and that ban offlabel use of certain abortion-inducing drugs
are unconstitutional, the state Supreme
Court ruled Tuesday.
The state's highest court determined that
lower court judges were right to halt the
laws. In separate decisions, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court said the laws, which
received wide bipartisan support in the
Legislature, violated a 1992 U.S. Supreme
Court case.

represent a "sweeping and unequivocal"
rejection of the Legislature's attempt to
restrict the reproductive rights of women.
Nancy Northup, the center's president and
CEO, said Oklahoma has been a testing
ground for a national network of
organizations she said are hostile to women,
doctors and the rights of both.
"But despite their best efforts to chip away
at women's fundamental rights, the courts
have consistently rejected these extreme
assaults on reproductive freedom," Northrup
said in a statement.

The Oklahoma court said it has a duty to
"follow the mandate of the United State
Supreme Court on matters of federal
constitutional law."

State Attorney General Scott Pruitt, whose
office appealed lower-court decisions that
invalidated the laws, said he is considering
appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Legislature passed the ultrasound law in
2010. Oklahoma is one of several states that
have passed laws requiring doctors to both
perform an ultrasound and provide a verbal
description of the fetus before an abortion.
The other law was approved in 2011.

"We disagree with the court's decision,
particularly with the fact that the question on
whether Oklahoma's Constitution provides a
right to an abortion was left unanswered,"
Pruitt said in a statement.

The
New
York-based
Center
for
Reproductive Rights challenged both laws,
and Oklahoma County judges had halted
their enforcement while the court cases
made their way through the judicial system.
Michelle Movahed, a staff attorney for the
abortion-rights group, said the rulings

The ultrasound law was struck down in
March by District Judge Bryan Dixon, who
ruled that the statute was an unconstitutional
special law that could not be enforced
because it addressed only patients,
physicians and sonographers dealing with
abortions without addressing other medical
care.
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Tony Lauinger, chairman of the antiabortion group Oklahomans for Life, said he
believes the state Supreme Court has
misinterpreted the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court
decision. He said the Oklahoma ultrasound
measure provides a level of informed
consent for women seeking abortions,
something he said the federal decision
permits.
"The ultrasound law does not prohibit
abortion. It regulates abortion," Lauinger
said.
The other state law was rejected in May by
District Judge Donald Worthington, who
ruled it violated "the fundamental rights of
women to privacy and bodily integrity."
The law required doctors to follow strict
guidelines authorized by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration and prohibited offlabel uses of certain abortion-inducing drugs
such as RU-486. Such moves include
changing a recommended dosage or
prescribing it for different symptoms than
the drug was initially approved for.

The law also required doctors to examine
women before prescribing the drugs,
document certain medical conditions and
schedule follow-up appointments.
Pruitt said he was disappointed with the
court's decision.
"There is overwhelming evidence that the
off-label use of abortion-inducing drugs
leads to serious infections and death for
many healthy, unsuspecting women. This is
not OK," Pruitt said.
All nine justices on the court joined in the
decision involving the abortion-inducing
drugs, while eight justices concurred in the
ultrasound ruling. Justice Noma Gurich, a
former Oklahoma County judge who issued
an injunction blocking enforcement of that
law in July 2010, recused herself from the
decision.
Earlier this year, the state Supreme Court
halted an effort to grant "personhood" rights
to human embryos, citing the same 1992
U.S. Supreme Court case. The U.S. Supreme
Court refused to take up the case on appeal.
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“Supreme Court Agrees to Review Oklahoma Abortion Pill Case”
Christian Science Monitor
Warren Richey
June 27, 2013
At issue is whether an Oklahoma law
requires women and their doctors to follow a
protocol that effectively limits access to
chemically induced abortions. But first, the
Supreme Court wants clarification on what,
exactly, the state law outlaws.

examine whether the Oklahoma Supreme
Court ruled correctly when it invalidated the
2011 state law that had mandated that all
drug-induced abortions in the state follow a
specific protocol.

The US Supreme Court on Thursday agreed
to
wade
into
a
dispute
over
an Oklahoma regulation of the abortioninducing drug RU-486.

Under the law, abortion providers were
required to follow instructions approved by
the Food and Drug Administration back in
2000 when chemically induced abortions
were first approved.

In a brief order, the justices agreed to take
up the case, and then asked the Oklahoma
Supreme Court to determine whether the
disputed state law bars the application of
certain drugs used in chemically induced
abortions.

The Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive
Justice challenged the law, arguing that the
2000 protocol had since become obsolete
and had been replaced by newer time-tested
procedures and doses that were safer, more
effective, and less expensive.

The court said that further proceedings in
the case would be reserved pending receipt
of a response from the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma.

The new procedures allow a woman to selfadminister a second drug at home rather
than in a clinic. They also extended the
effective use of the chemically induced
abortion process from 49 days into the
pregnancy to 63 days.

The action came in an appeal filed on behalf
of the Oklahoma attorney general asking the
justices to reinstate an Oklahoma law
regulating RU-486 abortions that was struck
down by the state high court in December.
The law sought to limit chemically induced
abortions to a protocol of procedures that
critics said were outdated and would
effectively ban the procedure.

Mr. Wyrick said the state legislature was
justified in favoring the older protocol
because eight otherwise healthy young
women have died from bacterial infections
following chemically induced abortions
using one of the newer protocols. In
contrast, he said, no women have died
following use of the older protocol.

In his brief to the court, Oklahoma Solicitor
General Patrick Wyrick asked the justices to

The state solicitor general said the
Oklahoma law merely regulates the manner
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in which abortion-inducing drugs were
administered and does not ban the use of
those drugs.

representing the Oklahoma Coalition, said in
her brief that the Oklahoma law goes too far
in restricting access to abortions.

A state court judge struck the statute down,
because it was deemed to impose a
substantial obstacle to a woman obtaining an
abortion.

She said the Oklahoma legislature had
enacted several laws in recent years seeking
to restrict abortions in the state. The state
Supreme Court has upheld some, but
overturned others as too restrictive.

The judge concluded in part that the state
law “is so completely at odds with the
standard that governs the practice of
medicine that it can serve no purpose other
than to prevent women from obtaining
abortions, and to punish and discriminate
against those who do.”
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
ruled that the state law was unconstitutional
under the US Supreme Court’s abortion
precedent,
Planned
Parenthood
of
Pennsylvania v. Casey.
Wyrick said the state high court was wrong.
“House Bill 1970 does not prohibit any type
of abortion,” he said in his brief to the court.
“It merely requires that abortion inducing
drugs be administered in the manner
approved by the FDA.”
Michelle Movahed, a lawyer with the Center
for Reproductive Rights, which is

“The statute at issue here effectively bans all
abortions performed using medication
(rather than by surgery), no matter how early
in the pregnancy,” Ms. Movahed wrote in
her brief.
“The statute’s only practical consequence is
to force a woman who wishes to terminate a
pregnancy to undergo a surgical procedure
even though a safe, effective, non-invasive,
and widely used alternative is available,”
she said.
Movahed said the newer protocols were
legal and common. She said nationwide
protocols other than FDA approved protocol
from 2000 are being used in at least 96
percent of chemically induced abortions.
The case is Terry Cline v. Oklahoma
Coalition for Reproductive Justice (121094).
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“State Laws Limiting Abortion May Face Challenges on 20-Week Limit”
NPR
Julie Rovner
July 22, 2013
Banning abortions after a specific point in
pregnancy has been a popular trend in the
states this year. Last week, GOP Gov. Rick
Perry made Texas the 12th state to ban most
abortions after 20 weeks.
But how states define the starting point for
that 20 weeks may cause headaches for
women and their doctors — and ultimately
affect whether these laws pass constitutional
muster.
Like all but one of the abortion bans passed
so far in the states, the Texas law starts its
20-week calendar at fertilization. But that's
not the same as saying 20 weeks of
pregnancy, because that's not how doctors
measure pregnancy.
"When we refer to the weeks of pregnancy,
weeks of gestation, we measure pregnancy
from the date of the last normal menstrual
period," says Dr. Daniel Grossman. He's an
assistant professor of obstetrics, gynecology
and reproductive sciences at the University
of California, San Francisco and a vice
president of IBIS Reproductive Health, a
reproductive rights advocacy group.
"For a woman who has a normal menstrual
period, ovulation or fertilization would
generally occur two weeks later, after that
start of that normal menstrual period,"
Grossman says. "The age of the embryo or
the fetus is essentially two weeks less than

the number of weeks measured from the last
menstrual period."
Last menstrual period, or LMP, is generally
how doctors refer to the weeks of
pregnancy. Forty weeks LMP is considered
full term for a normal pregnancy, even
though at that point fertilization occurred
only 38 weeks before. So why do doctors
use a measurement that's so imprecise?
That standard developed in the old days
before ultrasound was widely used,
Grossman says. "The last menstrual period
was something that was knowable and was
measurable, whereas it wasn't always known
when fertilization took place."
With few exceptions, however, that's not
how the state laws — and a bill that passed
the U.S. House last month — are being
written.
"What we're seeing with these laws is that
they are pegging the beginning of pregnancy
to fertilization," says Elizabeth Nash, who
tracks state issues for the Guttmacher
Institute, an abortion rights think tank.
"So when we talk about a law that bans
abortion at 20 weeks post-fertilization, we're
really talking about a law that bans abortion
at 22 weeks of pregnancy," she says.
Why is it, then that people keep referring to
these as 20 week laws?
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Nash says it's not that hard to figure out.
"That's the term that is used in the bill, and
oftentimes when you see a term used in the
bill it becomes the headline," she says.
But whether the laws seek to ban abortion at
20 weeks or 22 weeks, one thing is clear,
says Daniel Grossman. The ban they would
impose is earlier than what's currently
considered viability, or when a fetus can
survive outside the womb.

of these laws makes its way to the justices,
they might change their minds.
Similar doubts were raised about about the
constitutionality of an earlier ban few
thought would survive court scrutiny,
according to Douglas Johnson of the
National Right to Life Committee.

"I think there's definitely consensus that
viability doesn't happen before 24 menstrual
weeks," he says. "So when we're talking
about banning abortion at 20 or 22 weeks
even, that's clearly at least two weeks before
the earliest point in pregnancy where
viability would be a concern."

"The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act was
struck down by every lower fed court that
considered it," Johnson said last week at a
press conference on the federal version of
the 20-week ban. "Three U.S. District
Courts; three U.S. Courts of Appeals all
ruled it was in clear violation of U.S.
Supreme Court precedent. But when it
reached the U.S. Supreme Court they said
otherwise. And they upheld it."

That's important, because current Supreme
Court precedent says states can't ban
abortion before viability. But those pushing
these laws clearly hope that by the time one

So whether you count to 20 or 22, the
ultimate number that will matter most is five
— the number of Supreme Court justices
needed for a majority.
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“Abortion Restrictions Become Law in Texas, but Opponents Will Press
Fight”
The New York Times
Manny Fernandez
July 18, 2013
Six months after declaring his goal to make
abortion at any stage “a thing of the past,”
Gov. Rick Perry signed a bill into law
Thursday giving Texas some of the toughest
restrictions on abortion in the country, even
as women’s rights advocates vowed to
challenge the law’s legality in court.
Surrounded by Republican legislators and
abortion opponents in an auditorium at the
Texas Capitol in Austin, Mr. Perry said they
were celebrating and cementing “the
foundation on which the culture of life in
Texas is built upon.” As he spoke, the chants
and shouts of “Shame! Shame!” by the bill’s
opponents, gathered outside the auditorium,
could be heard.
The measure, House Bill 2, bans abortions
after 20 weeks of pregnancy, requires
abortion clinics to meet the same standards
as hospital-style surgical centers and
mandates that a doctor have admitting
privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of
the facility where he or she performs
abortions.
Abortion rights advocates and Democrats
said the law could force a majority of the
state’s 42 abortion clinics to close. The new
provision that clinics be licensed as
ambulatory surgery centers would require
costly renovations or relocations to meet the
architectural and equipment standards.

Only five abortion clinics — in Austin, San
Antonio, Dallas and Houston — meet those
standards. The requirement that doctors
performing abortions have admitting
privileges at nearby hospitals could force the
closing of some clinics that use visiting
doctors or that are located where local
hospitals refuse to provide such privileges.
Mr. Perry and other Republicans said the
law would improve patient safety and hold
abortion clinics to safer standards.
Opponents said that it amounted to an
unconstitutional attack on legal abortion in
Texas and that many of the restrictions were
found to be medically unnecessary by
physicians groups.
“The fight over this law will move to the
courts, while the bigger fight for women’s
access to health care in Texas gains steam,”
said Cecile Richards, the president of the
Planned Parenthood Federation of America
and the Planned Parenthood Action Fund,
and a daughter of Ann Richards, the former
Texas governor. “People are enraged by this
law, and it has created a whole new
generation of activists who are in it for the
long run to elect leaders who will protect
women’s health.”
The law does not take effect immediately.
The admitting privileges restriction and the
ban on abortions after 20 weeks take effect
90 days after a special legislative session
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ends later this month. Abortion clinics have
until September 2014 to comply with the
surgical-center standards. Opponents of the
law said they were evaluating their litigation
options, and it appeared likely that lawsuits
would be filed before any of the restrictions
take effect.
Similar restrictions that have been enacted in
other states have been tied up in legal
challenges. Bans on abortions after 20
weeks have been adopted by 11 other states,
but in three of those states — Arizona,
Georgia and Idaho — courts have blocked
the laws from taking effect. The requirement
that doctors have admitting privileges at a
nearby hospital has been blocked by courts
in Mississippi, Alabama and North Dakota.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled
that states can regulate abortions so long as
the rules do not pose an “undue burden” on
a woman’s right to an abortion. Opponents
of the law are likely to argue that the
surgical-center standards and their effect on
women seeking abortions across the state
pose an undue burden and are thus
unconstitutional.
“The A.C.L.U. is involved in litigation in 5
of the 10 states where similar abortion
restrictions have been enacted, and we are
evaluating our options in Texas,” said Terri
Burke, the executive director of the
American Civil Liberties Union of Texas.
“What makes Texas different is our size:
House Bill 2 leaves 35 percent of the
population without access to abortion care
and those are rural and, often, poor women.”

The provision banning abortions at 20 weeks
after fertilization and later is based on a
medically disputed theory that a fetus can
feel pain at that stage. The Supreme Court
has ruled that women have a right to an
abortion until the point at which the fetus is
viable outside the womb — usually around
24 weeks after a woman’s last menstrual
period, or 22 weeks after fertilization.
Mr. Perry addressed the issue of fetal pain at
the bill-signing ceremony on Thursday. “At
five months, many studies indicate that these
children feel pain,” he said, adding that it
was Texans’ responsibility “to give voice to
the unborn individuals whose survival is at
stake.”
The ceremony was a procedural coda to the
heated battle over abortion that has played
out at the Capitol. Thousands of men and
women — on the both sides of the debate,
though opponents of the bill largely
outnumbered supporters — have testified,
rallied and protested there since June, when
Mr. Perry added the bill to the Legislature’s
agenda.
The bill failed to pass during the regular
session, which ended May 27, so Mr. Perry
added it on June 11 to a special session in an
effort to get it passed. But at the end of the
special session on June 25, an 11-hour
filibuster by State Senator Wendy Davis,
Democrat of Fort Worth, helped kill the bill,
turning her into a national political celebrity.
Mr. Perry responded by calling a second
special session, and the Republicandominated Legislature quickly passed the
restrictions last week. Though their efforts
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to block the bill had ultimately failed,
Democrats have been emboldened by the
filibuster and the battle over abortion. In
June, Ms. Davis received nearly $1 million

in campaign contributions in two weeks. She
received more than 15,000 individual
contributions, many from people who gave
her $50 or less.
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“California Abortion Bill Shows Gulf with Other States”
Bloomberg
Michael B. Marois & Esme E. Deprez
August 28, 2013
To see the growing gulf over abortion
between California and other states, look no
further than the Colorado River that marks
the state’s border with Arizona.
On the California side, a bill heading soon to
Democratic Governor Jerry Brown would
make it easier for rural women to terminate
pregnancies by allowing nurse practitioners
and midwives to perform abortions in the
first 12 weeks, now provided only by
doctors.
Across the river in Arizona, Republican
Governor Jan Brewer effectively banned
nurse practitioners from doing the
procedures in 2011. Five Planned
Parenthood
clinics
stopped offering
abortions when doctors couldn’t be found,
according to Cynde Cerf, a spokeswoman.
California “completely bucks the trend that
we’ve been seeing in other states in the past
three years, which is to adopt abortion
restrictions en masse,” said Elizabeth Nash,
state issues manager for the New Yorkbased
Guttmacher
Institute,
which
researches and compiles reproductive health
data. “This is moving in a completely
different direction than what we are seeing
in other states.”
The California measure, approved this week
by the Democrat-controlled state Senate,
contrasts with at least 178 laws restricting
abortion that other states have passed since

2010, according to the institute. The laws
have made it more difficult for women to get
abortions, despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s
1973 decision in Roe v. Wade that legalized
a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.
Five States
If signed into law by Brown, California
would be the fifth state to permit nonphysician abortions, joining Montana, New
Hampshire, Oregon and Vermont, according
to a study by the University of California,
San Francisco. Thirty-nine states require a
licensed physician.
The author of the California bill, Assembly
Majority Leader Toni Atkins, a San Diego
Democrat, said the legislation was needed to
help women in the half of the state’s
counties without a doctor to perform
abortions. The Senate version of the bill will
go back to the Assembly to reconcile
amendments before it’s sent to Brown.
Arizona’s law signed by Brewer two years
ago prohibited the state nursing board from
determining whether abortion care was
within the scope of practice for nurse
practitioners.
The effect was immediate. There are seven
abortion clinics in the state today, down
from 19 in 2010 because of the measure and
other restrictive laws, according to NARAL
Pro-Choice Arizona, which opposes the
limits.
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Local Facilities
Eighty-seven percent of U.S. counties have
no local facilities for abortion, according to
the University of California study. Those
areas are home to more than a third of
women aged 15 to 44, the study showed.
A similar California bill failed last year after
some Democrats said they were concerned
that abortions performed by non-physicians
wouldn’t be as safe. That measure was
amended to allow nurse practitioners and
other clinicians to dispense abortioninducing drugs, and was signed Brown.
Many of the anti-abortion laws passed in
recent years have been argued on the basis
that they improve health and safety. They
have also proven effective at shuttering
providers: In addition to Arizona,

restrictions have been blamed for closing at
least a dozen clinics in states including
Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
A University of California study published
in January in the American Journal of Public
Health found that complications from
abortions by nurse practitioners, nurse
midwives or physician’s assistants were
“clinically equivalent” to those performed
by doctors.
“I can’t think of a single national trend that
California isn’t bucking,” said Brian
Johnston, the Western Regional Director at
the National Right to Life Committee. “The
reality is that a human life must end for this
to be an abortion and so this is an issue of
huge significance, and other states recognize
that.”
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“Anti-Abortion Laws Take Dramatic Toll On Clinics Nationwide”
Huffington Post
Laura Bassett
August 26, 2013
More than 50 abortion clinics across the
country have closed or stopped offering the
procedure since a heavy wave of legislative
attacks on providers began in 2010,
according to The Huffington Post's
nationwide survey of state health
departments, abortion clinics and local
abortion-focused advocacy groups.
At least 54 abortion providers across 27
states have shut down or ended their
abortion services in the past three years, and
several more clinics are only still open
because judges have temporarily blocked
legislation that would make it difficult for
them to continue to operate. Nebraska and
Massachusetts have each added one clinic
since 2010, and the other 21 states and the
District of Columbia, most of which have
not passed new anti-abortion laws since
2010, were unable to accurately count their
clinics because their health departments do
not license abortion providers separately
from other kinds of medical providers. The
Huffington Post's tally did not include
hospitals that provide abortions.
"This kind of change is incredibly
dramatic," said Elizabeth Nash, state issues
manager at the Guttmacher Institute, a
reproductive health research organization.
"What we've been seeing since 1982 was a
slow decline, but this kind of change ... [is]
so different from what's happened in the
past."

A comprehensive survey by The Daily Beast
found that as of January 2013, 724 abortion
clinics remained operational across the U.S.
While some of the 54 closures were due to
unrelated factors, the states that have lost the
most clinics over the past three years are the
same ones that have seen draconian new
abortion restrictions and the biggest cuts to
family planning funding. In Texas, which
has lost nine clinics, lawmakers have
slashed family planning funding in the state
budget, required abortion clinics to become
ambulatory surgical centers and required
abortion doctors to have admitting privileges
at a local hospital. Arizona lawmakers
passed similar legislation and pushed out a
total of 12 providers; the state had 18
abortion clinics in 2010 and now has only
six, according to NARAL Pro-Choice
Arizona.
"This has turned into a nightmare," said Kat
Sabine, executive director of NARAL's
Arizona affiliate. "The kind of efforts the
women have to take to get family planning
or abortion services are just incredible, and
you can only get care if you can get out of
the community to do it. If you're on a
reservation or rural part of the state, unless
you have reliable transportation, you're not
going to get care."
In Lake Havusu, Ariz., there are several
anti-abortion Crisis Pregnancy Centers and a
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Catholic charity hospital that does not offer
abortion care, but women have to travel over
150 miles to either Phoenix or Las Vegas to
find the nearest abortion or family planning
clinic, Sabine said. The situation mirrors
problems rural women face in other states.
Mississippi, North Dakota and South Dakota
have only one abortion clinic each, and the
first two are hanging onto their only clinics
pending court decisions. Other larger states,
like Alaska and Texas, do not have nearly
enough providers to respond to the needs of
women in rural areas, because the clinics are
concentrated in a few major cities.
Compounding the problem, 26 states require
women to wait at least 24 hours between
their consultation sessions and abortion
procedures, making it twice as difficult for
rural and low-income women to access
abortion care.
"These restrictions have an uneven impact,"
Nash said. "Women who have resources,
have a car, have some money in the bank,
can access childcare and take time off work
can obtain an abortion, and women who are
less well-off and don't have those kinds of
resources are not able to access abortion
services."
While states have been passing abortion
restrictions since long before 2010, the
recent legislative trend has been to directly
target abortion providers and make it harder
for them to operate. In addition to passing
mandatory waiting periods and mandatory
ultrasounds, states are passing so-called
"TRAP" laws -- the Targeted Regulation of
Abortion Providers. These laws often

require abortion clinics to undergo extensive
and costly renovations in order to become
ambulatory surgical centers, which are
essentially mini-hospitals.
Anti-abortion advocates, meanwhile, argue
that TRAP laws are designed to protect
women's health by forcing clinics to widen
their hallways, install specific ventilation
systems and build locker rooms for
physicians. Kristi Hamrick, a spokesperson
for Americans United for Life, told HuffPost
that the new restrictions are not the reason
clinics are shutting down. "It was the choice
of the abortion industry to locate their
profitable abortion businesses in older
buildings that would never pass muster for
other outpatient surgical centers," she said.
"It was their choice to ignore the laws of any
given state on building requirements for
outpatient medical facilities -- set by that
state in line with a national standards board,
not AUL -- and choose locations that were
not as safe."
Hamrick added that the fact that most of the
available information on abortion clinic
closures comes from the clinics themselves
is evidence of the fact that states do not
regulate the clinics enough. While some
state health departments have specific
licenses for abortion providers, states vary
widely in how they count providers. Some
only license ambulatory surgical centers that
provide abortions, and others have no
separate category for abortion providers,
making it difficult to get an accurate count
of how many providers there are without
thumbing through the phone book.

497

"While the abortion industry has claimed
that their businesses have suffered, we have
only their word on that," she said.
The murder trial of Kermit Gosnell, the
abortion provider in Pennsylvania who
performed illegal, late-term abortions and
allegedly "snipped" the spines of fetuses
born alive, has fueled the drive to regulate
abortion clinics even further. A group of
House Republicans wrote letters to the
health departments and attorneys general of
all 50 states in May, citing the Gosnell trial
and asking what exactly states are doing to
"protect the civil rights of newborns and
their mothers."
RH Reality Check obtained 38 states'
responses to that inquiry and published
them. The publication's analysis of the
documents concluded that abortion clinics in
most states are aggressively regulated and
extremely safe.

"Most states said that they conduct regular
inspections of abortion clinics, or of
hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, or
other types of facilities where abortions can
be carried out," RH Reality Check reported.
"And most states said they were aware of
very few — if any — incidents of patients
being harmed as a result of an abortion."
Still, Republicans at the state and federal
level are proposing new ways to restrict
abortion every time a legislative session
begins, giving women in their states fewer
and fewer options when faced with an
unplanned or unhealthy pregnancy.
"These restrictions do nothing to reduce the
need for abortion or to reduce unintended
pregnancy," Nash said. "I would say that
those that are promoting these very
burdensome clinic regulations have as an
end goal the elimination of legal abortion.
They don't have women's health in mind."
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